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The Application of Prisoner-Of-W ar Status to 
Guerrillas Under the First Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 10, 1977 the fourth and last session of the Diplomatic Conference 
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts drew to a close.' The signing of the Final Act 
on that date marked the completion of the Conference's objective: to study 
and promulgate two draft Additional Protocols prepared by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and intended to supplement the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. 2 
The first of the two Protocols adopted by the Conference concerns the pro-
tection of victims of international armed conflicts, and contains 102 articles 
and two technical annexes. 3 The second Protocol contains 28 articles pro-
1. The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts was convened by the Swiss Federal Council. 
The first session of the Conference took place from February 20 to March 29, 1974 with the task 
of reaching a decision regarding two draft Protocols submitted by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross. The second session lasted from February 3 to April 18, 1975, and the third from 
April 21 to June 11, 1976. Finally, the fourth session, at which the final round of debates took 
place, met from March 17 to June 10,1977. See Extractsfrom the Final Act of the Diplomatic Con-
ference, 197-198 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 123, 123 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Extractsfrom the Final 
Act); Diplomatic Coriference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Ap· 
plicable in Armed Conflicts: A Summary of the Work of the Fourth Session, 196 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 
338, 338 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Summary of the Fourth Session). 
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, (1955) 3 V.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 
V.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, (1955) 3 V.S.T. 3217, 
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 V.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, (1955)3 V.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 V.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
cited as GPW); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949 (1955)3 V.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 V.N.T.S. 287. 
3. Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are repn'nted in 197-198 
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Protocol I, Protocol II). 
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viding for the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. It is 
designed to supplement an area of law that had been specifically covered only 
by Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions. t 
The first Protocol marks a significant departure from the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 in that it sets forth specific rules pertaining to the means and 
methods of combat. 5 Previously, the only such guidelines were found in the 
Hague Regulations of 1907,6 and not the Geneva Conventions which referred 
only to humanitarian protections. 7 Thus, while the recent Protocol has been 
called a "charter ofhumanity"8 and is indeed of a humanitarian character, its 
102 articles present a supplementation and a clarification of a broader area of 
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts than had been 
previously considered in anyone document. 
Articles 43 and 44 of the new Protocol combine to create new criteria for 
combatant and prisoner-of-war status modifying the requirements contained 
in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War (GPW).9 These Articles remove some restrictions imposed by the 
G PW and no longer require that combatants wear distinctive clothing as had 
been the case under Article 4 of the GPW. Instead, certain combatants are 
now required only to distinguish themselves from the civilian populace during 
each military engagement and while engaged in deployment operations which 
are visible to the adversary preceding the launching of an attack. 10 This per-
mits members of resistance and liberation movements to acquire prisoner-of-
war status more easily, provided that such movements also meet other more 
traditional criteria for lawful combatancyll and are involved in an interna-
tional conflict as defined by Article 1.12 Thus, Articles 43 and H mark a 
significant change in the law of warfare by permitting guerrillas, who in the 
4. Article 3 is known as the "convention in miniature" and applies "[i)n the case of armed 
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties .... " See notes 46-48 infra and accompanying text. 
5. See Graham, The 1974 Diplomatic Corifemu;e on the Law of War: A Victory/or Political Causes and a 
Return to the "Just War" Concept of the Ele7Jl1llh Century, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 25, 45 (1975) 
(hereinafter cited as Graham). See, e.g., Methods and Means of Warfare, Protocol I, supra note 3, 
arts. 35-42, pt. III, S I, pertaining to the basic rules of combat, use of new weapons, prohibition 
of perfidy, recognized emblems, emblems of nationality, quarter, safeguard of an enemy hors tk 
combat, and occupants of aircraft. 
6. Regulations to the Hague Convention IV of 1907, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 
539 [hereinafter cited as Hague Regulations). 
7. See generally, 1 GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, COMMENTARY 42 a. Pictet ed. 
1960) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARY). 
8. See Pictet, Les NouveaWt Aspects du Droit Inlmlational Humaniloire, 706 REVUE INTERNATIONAL 
DE LA CROIX ROUGE [R.I.C.R.) 443, 443 (1977). 
9. See note 2 supra. 
10. See S IV irifra. 
11. See S IV irifra. 
12. See S III, B infra. 
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past have not easily fallen within the traditional legal criteria and classifica-
tions,15 to more easily claim the benefits of prisoner of war status. 
This Comment will first provide a brief historical review of the denial of 
prisoner-of-war status to the guerrilla in order that Articles 43 and 44 of Pro-
tocol I may be evaluated. It will then examine the concurrent actions of the In-
ternational Committee ofthe Red Cross and the United Nations in seeking to 
enhance the status of the guerrilla under international law. Finally, the author 
will evaluate the new criteria for prisoner of war status and explore their 
efficacy in serving the needs of modern warfare. 
II. THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF GUERRILLAS: DENIAL OF 
PRISONER OF WAR STATUS 
A. The Nature of Guerrilla Waifare 
"Guerrilla warfare" refers to the type of military tactics employed rather 
than to the nature ofthe conflict itself.1+ Guerrilla tactics are employed in both 
internal and international conflicts, regardless of insurgency or belligerency 
status,15 and may be utilized by both lawful and unlawful insurgents or 
belligerents. 16 The employment of guerrilla actions generally occurs when 
there is a marked inequality of forces engaged in the conflictY In such cir-
cumstances, one of the parties to the conflict often seeks to overcome 
technological, economic, or manpower deficiencies by recourse to the action of 
unconventional forces. IS 
Despite these deficiencies, however, guerrilla warfare is quite effective. The 
13. See S II infra. 
14. See Bond, Protection of Non-Combatants in Guerrilla Wars, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 788 
n.5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Protection of Non-Combatants]. 
15. See gmerally, D. BINSCHEDLER-ROBERT, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFUCT 38-45 (1971), cited 
in Protection of Non-Combatants, supra note 12, at 788 n.5. 
16. See Paust, Law in a Guerrilla Conflict: Myths, Norms and Human Rights 3 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN 
RIGHTS 39,47 (1973). [hereinafter cited as Paust]. Status of belligerency is simply a question of 
fact dependent upon the characteristics of the conflict. Generally, publicists have recognized five 
criteria as evidence of belligermg status, where: 1) the armed conflict is accompanied by large-
scale hostilities necessitating the involvement of regular forces by the established state; 2) the in-
surgentslbelligerents occupy and control a substantial and determinate amount of territory; 3) 
the insurgents/belligerents establish an effective and orderly government to administer the con-
trolled territory; 4) the insurgent/belligerent forces act under the direction of an organized and 
responsible civil authority and tend to observe the ordinary laws of war; 5) there exists the prac-
tical necessity for third states to define their attitude towards the conflict. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 249 (7th ed_ H. Lauterpacht 1948) [hereinafter cited as L. OPPENHEIM]; L. 
Mc NAIR, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OFW AR 32 (4th ed. 1966); Falk,janus Tormented: The Intmuuional 
Lawoflntemal War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 197 n.1O a. Rosenau ed. 1964) 
[hereinafter cited as Falk.] 
17. See gmerally, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE OUTUNE OF A 
COURSE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 36 (1976). 
18. See id. 
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guerrillas' knowledge of the fighting terrain, their capacity for rapid move-
ment, their secretive nature, and their ability to melt away into the coun-
tryside and towns while evading pursuit, and to obtain shelter, treatment, and 
sustenance from family and friends in the area, give them many advantages 
over military units using more conventional methods of warfare. 19 Their 
strategy has been generally characterized as employing dispersed and mobile 
groups, resorting to surprise attacks, ambushes and sabotage, and avoiding 
pitched battles. Therefore guerrilla tactics have been met with disapproval. 20 
A consensus of disapproval of guerrilla activities was reached among early 
international jurists such as Ayala (1582), Grotius (1612), Gentili (1620) and 
Pufendorf (1688). They commonly viewed such activities as acts of brigand-
age, the perpetrators of which were considered to be the "common enemy of 
all.' '21 Their writings point out the fact that guerrilla warfare has been an ex-
periential factor across the centuries. 
Indeed, the modern name "guerrilla," meaning little war (guerra), had its 
genesis in the Spanish people's resistance to the Napoleonic occupation forces 
in 1809. 22 Guerrilla warfare later became an oft-occurring phenomenon in the 
United States-Mexican War (1846-1848), as well as in the Civil War.23 It was 
during the latter conflict that General Grant issued the following order in 1862 
which remarkably could have been issued a century later: "Persons acting as 
guerrillas without organization and without uniform to distinguish them from 
private citizens are not entitled to treatment as prisoners of war when caught 
and will not receive such treatment. "2. 
The requirement that combatants were to be "organized" and "uni-
formed" also formed a basis for Francis Lieber's work Instructions for the 
Government oj the Armies of the United States in the Field which was published the 
following year. 25 Subsequently issued by President Lincoln as an Official 
Army Order,26 Lieber's work is considered to be the first major attempt to 
19. See generally, Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla Waifare, 45 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT'L L. 173, 177-178 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Draper]. 
20. See U.N. Sec'y Gen., Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. AI7720 
53 (1969). [hereinafter cited as 1969 Report of the Sec'y General]. 
21. See Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 177, 188-89 n.39 
(1945). 
22. See 1969 Report of the Sec'y General, supra note 20, at 53. It is interesting to note that the 
guerrilla forces gave Napoleon his first crucial defeat. See Paust, supra note 16, at 46. 
23. See Colby, War Crimes, 23 MICH. L. REV. 482, 502 (1925). 
24. Paust, supra note 16, at 127. The criteria Grant viewed as necessary, i.e., organization, 
and the requirement that soldiers be dressed in distinctive uniform, were to form part of the 
Brussels, Hague, and Geneva rules. See discussion infra, this section. 
25. See note 26 infra. 
26. U.S. Adjutant General's Office, War Dep't, General Orders No. 100, Wash., D.C., April 
24, 1863. In 1862 Lieber was a Professor of Law at Columbia College and had published his 
general thesis of the Instnu:tions under the title of Guerrilla Parties Considered with Refmru;e to the Laws 
and Usages of War. See Draper, supra note 19, at 179. 
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codify the customary rules of land warfare prevailing at the end of the first half 
of the nineteenth centuryY Significantly, Lieber set forth this instruction 
regarding guerrilla warfare: 
82. Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by 
fighting, or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any 
kind, without commission, without being part and portion of the 
organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, 
but do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or 
with the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pur-
suits, divesting themselves of the character of appearance of soldiers - such 
men or squads of men, are public enemies, and therefore, if cap-
tured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall 
be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates. 28 
Lieber's views later took an increasing prominence in the codification of the 
international law of warfare, as they came to be the basis of the proposed 
Declaration of Brussels in 1874,29 which in turn formed much of the basis for 
the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. 30 
B. Codification of the International Law of Warfare 
Although their work never reached final passage, the delegates of fifteen 
European countries who assembled in Brussels in 1874 approved the "Project 
of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs ofWar. 31 
Article 9 listed the criteria for prisoner-of-war status which remained largely 
untouched until the recent Diplomatic Conference: 
The laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also 
to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
1 ) That they be commanded by a person responsible for his subor-
dinates; 
2 ) That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a 
distance; 
3 ) That they carry arms openly; and 
27. See, e.g., Draper, supra note 19, at 179. 
28. Veuthey, Military Instructions on the Treatment of Prisoners in Guerrilla Warfare, 132 INT'L REV. 
RED CROSS 125 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Military Instructions]. 
29. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, 
Adopted by the Conference of Brussels, 1874, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 96 (1907) 
[hereinafter cited as Brussels Declaration]. 
30. The Brussels Declaration formed the basis of Articles 4 to 20 of the Regulations annexed to 
the Hague Convention IV of 1907. See Esgain & Solf, The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War: Its Principles, Innovations, and Deficiencies, 1975 MIL. L. REV. BICENT. 
ISSUE 303, 305. 
31. See Military Instructions, supra note 28, at 130. The texts of the proposed codification of the 
law of war which failed to secure adoption at Brussels in 1874 were brought forward at the First 
Hague Peace Conference in 1899. See Draper, supra note 19, at 179. 
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4 ) That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war. 32 
These criteria received approval in the practice of the Russian court-martial 
proceeding of 1904 which resulted in the conviction and sentencing to execu-
tion of two Japanese officers who had disguised themselves as peasants in 
order to blow up a railway bridge in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese 
War.33 In addition, the British experience in the Boer War (1899-1902) with 
substantial guerrilla involvement also strengthened the need for the above 
criteria." These events helped to ensure the passage of Article 1 of the Hague 
Regulations of 190735 which set forth criteria for prisoner-of-war status virtu-
ally identical to the four conditions listed by the drafters of the abortive 
Declaration of Brussels. 
Between the date of the Hague Convention in 1907 and that of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, guerrilla activities had played substantial roles in both 
the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1934 and the Spanish Civil War of 1936-9.36 
More importantly, perhaps, substantial resistance activities to the German oc-
cupation forces had occurred during World War II which were fresh in the 
minds of the representatives to the Diplomatic Conference for the Establish-
ment ofthe Geneva Conventions of 1949.'7 After extensive debate concerning 
the treatment of guerrillas, the representatives at Geneva decided that such 
persons, as "members of organized resistance movements belonging to a 
Party to the conflict, " should be entitled to treatment as prisoners of war pro-
vided that they also fulfilled the four criteria laid down in Brussels in 1874 and 
the Hague in 1907.38 
32. Brussels Declaration, supra note 29, art. 9. 
33. See Paust, supra note 16, at 55. 
34. !d. 
35. Se, note 6 supra. 
36. Cj. Draper, supra note 19, at 183. 
37. See Yingling & Ginnane, The Geneva CORvm/ions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393, 401-02 
(1952) [hereinafter cited as Yingling & Ginnane]. 
38. See Brussels Declaration, supra note 29 art. 9; see also Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 
1. Article 4 of the GPW, provided in relevant part: 
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging 
to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy: 
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of 
militias or volunteer groups forming part of such armed forces. 
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps including 
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict 
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, 
providing that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resist-
ance movements, fulfill the following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fIxed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war. 
GPW, supra note 2, art. 4. 
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Thus, it is a myth that guerrilla warfare is of recent origin and that it was 
not considered by the drafters of international conventions. 39 Indeed, the con-
ditions imposed by the GPW for treatment of members of resistance 
movements as prisoners of war, were deliberately drafted so as to exclude from 
coverage many of the people acting as "partisans" during World War II.·o 
This was accomplished under the belief that those conditions were the 
minimum necessary if regular forces were to have any protection against at-
tacks by the civilian population and if any distinction was to be made between 
combatants and non-combatants. H 
Despite the fact that these international rules had already taken into con-
sideration the guerrilla method of warfare, the frequent recurrence of guerrilla 
tactics, especially in wars of a civil character, has in recent times been viewed 
as rendering the earlier international rules of warfare inapplicable.·2 The 
adherents of this position believe that the law must accurately reflect com-
munity expectations rather than consist of a mere statement of often unheeded 
"rules" which no longer represent an accurate statement of the law. B 
This position draws support from the empirical evidence of the decades 
following the Geneva Conventions. The evidence clearly shows that guerrilla 
warfare, which had been the exception, has now become the rule, while the 
"conventional warfare" conducted by regular armies of constituted and 
recognized states has become the exception. H Certainly the drafters of the 
Geneva Conventions could not have foreseen the extent to which armed con-
flicts characterized by the employment of trained and uniformed armies would 
be replaced in human experience by a succession of internal struggles in which 
guerrilla tactics constituted the primary method of warfare. 45 Nor could the 
drafters have foreseen the extent to which their attempts to make operative 
certain minimum humanitarian standards would be effectively ignored. For in 
promulgating Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions, the drafters 
sought to obviate any necessity for defining civil war or requiring that any 
status of belligerency be obtained before the humanitarian protections of that 
article were made applicable in internal war.·6 Moreover, Article 3 was 
39. The exposure of this myth is the thesis of Paust, supra note 16. 
40. See Yingling & Ginnane, supra note 37, at 402. 
41. !d. 
42. See Higgins, Internal War and International Law, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDER, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 82 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited at 
HigginsJ. Falk, supra note 16, at 185-92. 
43. See Higgins, supra note 42, at 82. 
44. See Military Instructions, supra note 28, at 134. 
45. See DePue, The Amended First Article to the First Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949-lts Impact Upon Humanitarian Constraints Governing Armed Coriflict, 75 MIL. L. REV. 71, 
71-72 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DePueJ. 
46. See Firmage, Summary and Interpretation, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 415 
(R. Falk ed. 1971); see also M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 624 (1959) 
[hereinafter cited as M. GREENSPANJ. Common Article 3 provides: 
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designed to set forth established law that was independent of contractual 
obligations47 and whose provisions were to apply automatically without any 
condition of reciprocity. 48 
Despite these intentions, however, examination of the reception of Article 3 
into the general practice of states evidences a virtual unanimity of choice not to 
apply its provisions. There have been numerous violations of Article 3 in 
Malaya, the Hungarian Revolt of 1956, the Mau-Mau movement in Kenya, 
and the Katanga Rebellion in the Congo. 49 Moreover, neither the United 
Kingdom in the cases of Kenya, Malaya and Cyprus, nor the French in the 
case of Algeria were even willing to concede unequivocally that the conflicts 
were covered by Article 3, much less by the entire Conventions. 50 
As a result of this practice, there developed a recognition that the extant 
norms governing the conduct of such armed conflicts were unable to balance 
effectively the competing needs of both the guerrilla and the civilian for 
humanitarian protections from the ravages of war. It was this recognition 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to ap-
ply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion 
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time 
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment, and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without pre-
vious judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all 
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status 
of the Parties to the conflict. 
47. See M. GREENSPAN, supra note 46, at 624. 
48. See COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 48. 
49. Cj. Note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 851, 857 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Treatment of Prisoners). 
50. See Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward the D4inition of "International Armed 
Conflict," 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 52 (1971); Higgins, supra note 42, at 90-92; DePue, supra note 
45, at 83-84. 
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which ultimately led to the convening of the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Ap-
plicable in Armed Conflicts in February of 1974. 
III. THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 
A. Laying the Groundwork 
The recognition of the inability of international law to protect the victims of 
internal conflicts prompted the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to seek ways to strengthen the Geneva Conventions. 51 Meeting in 
Vienna in 1965, the 20th International Red Cross Conference issued Resolu-
tion No. 31 which urged the "continuance of efforts to strengthen means of 
rendering assistance to victims of internal conflicts."52 Four years later, this 
time meeting in Istanbul, the 21st International Red Cross Conference set in 
motion the background studies leading to the Diplomatic Conference of 
1974.53 Conference Resolution No. 17 urged' 'the study of measures to aug-
ment Common Article 3,"54 while Resolution No. 18 requested "the study of 
legal status of participants in non-international conflicts.' '55 
Contemporaneously with these developments, the United Nations General 
Assembly was seeking similar measures designed to augment the Geneva Con-
ventions. Providing the fillip behind this movement was Resolution No. 23 of 
the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968,56 
which requested the General Assembly to invite the Secretary-General to 
study" steps which should be taken to secure the better application of existing 
humanitarian international conventions and rules in all armed conflicts" and 
"the need for additional humanitarian conventions ... to ensure the better 
protection of civilians, prisoners and combatants .... "57 This resolution was 
accepted by the General Assembly which invited the Secretary-General to 
51. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a private international organiza-
tion headquartered in Geneva, and entirely Swiss in its direction, has historically considered itself 
the guardian of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Cj Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian 
Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic Coriference on Humanitarian Law, 16 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 5 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Baxter]. 
52. See DePue, supra note 45, at 72. 
53. See note 1 supra. 
54. See DePue, supra note 45, at 72. 
55. /d. In September 1968 the ICRC informed representatives of the National Red Cross (Red 
Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) Societies that it was launching a new effort to reaffirm and develop 
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. See Graham, supra note 5, at 28. 
56. Resolution XXIII, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. 
Doc. AlConf. 32/41, at 18 (1968). 
57. See Agenda item 115, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts: Report of the Sec'y 
General, annotated preliminary list of items to be included in the Provisional Agenda of the 32nd 
Regular Session of the General Assembly. U.N. Doc. Al32/92-134, at 224 (1977). [hereinafter 
cited as Provisional Agenda]. 
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undertake the study, in consultation with the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and other interested international organizations.'8 
Other actions taken by the General Assembly indicate its willingness to see 
prisoner-of-war status extended to guerrillas participating in wars of liberation 
from racist, alien or colonialist occupation. Several resolutions adopted by the 
General Assembly at its twenty-third session demonstrate this position.'9 In its 
resolution on apartheid, for example, the General Assembly declared that 
, 'freedom fighters should be treated as prisoners of war under international 
law, particularly the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War. . . .' '60 Similarly, in regard to the question of territories 
under Portuguese administration, the General Assembly called upon Portugal 
"to ensure the application to that situation of the Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War . . . .' '61 
As if competing with the General Assembly,62 the ICRC convened a Con-
ference of Government Experts in 1971 for the purpose of reinforcing and ex-
tending the international humanitarian law of war. 63 However, as a result of 
complaints that there had been insufficient representation from developing 
states, the ICRC convened a second Conference of Government Experts in 
1972 which was attended by 77 governmental representatives.54 
Prior to the second Conference of Government Experts, the ICRC legal 
staff had prepared two draft Protocols to supplement the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949.6' As revised during the second Conference, these Protocols formed 
58. G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), Dec. 16, 1968,23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 50, U.N. Doc. 
Al7218 (1969). See Provisional Agenda, supra note 57, at 224; see also Baxter, supra note 57, at 5. 
59. Resolution 2383 (XXIII) on the question of Southern Rhodesia; 2395 (XXIII) on the 
question of Territories under Portuguese administration; 2396 (XXIII) on the policies of apart· 
heid of the Government of South Africa; 2446 (XXIII) on measures to achieve the rapid and total 
elimination of all forms of racial discrimination in general and the policy of apartheid in par-
ticular. 
60. G.A. Res. 2396 (1968). See note 58 supra; if. DePue, supra note 45, at 88-89. 
61. G.A. Res. 2395 (1968). See note 58 supra; if. DePue, supra note 45, at 89, n.84. 
62. R.R. Baxter, for instance, cites "a certain conflict" between the General Assembly and 
the ICRC. See Baxter, supra note 51, at 5. J. MiramanofT-Chilikine found a "constructive com-
petition" and a "narrow collaboration" between these international organizations. See 
MiramanofT-Chilikine, Confbence Diplomatique sur la Reaffirmation et Ie Dlveloppernmt du Droit Interna-
tional Hurnanitaire Applicable dans les Conflicts Armis, 10 REVUE BELGE Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
[R.B.D.!.] 36, 39 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MiramanofT-Chilikine]. 
63. The Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development ofInter-
national Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts met in Geneva in May and June of 
1971. 
64. Invitations were extended to all parties signatory to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See 
U.S. Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development oflnter-
national Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts - First Session 1-2, Report Gune 
10, 1974) (available at Harvard Law School library) [hereinafter cited as Report ofU .S. Delega-
tion - First Session]; see also 1969 Report of the Sec'y General, supra note 20, at para. 213. 
65. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 1-2 CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE 
REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ApPLICABLE IN 
ARMED CONFLICTS (1972). [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS]. The 
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the basic documents for the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Con-
flicts. 
B. The Internationalization of Internal Wars 
The ICRC submitted the two draft protocols to the Diplomatic Conference. 
Protocol I was intended to supplement and clarify the four Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 insofar as they applied to international conflicts. All matters con-
cerning internal conflicts were to be exclusively within the province of Protocol 
II. However, from the outset of the Conference there emerged a strong move-
ment for the position that wars of national liberation primarily internal in 
scope were to be treated as if they were international conflicts.66 This move-
ment drew support from several resolutions of the United Nations which had 
focused on the conflicts in Portuguese Africa, Palestine, South Africa and 
Rhodesia. 67 
The proponents of the internationalization of wars of national liberation 
first displayed their strength in dealing with a preliminary procedural issue 
before the Diplomatic Conference - which political entities were to be 
represented at the Conference was a question. Representatives of the African 
National Congress, Angola National Liberation Front, Mozambique Libera-
tion Front, Palestine Liberation Organization, Panafricanist Congress, Peo-
ple's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, Seychelles People's United 
Party, South West African People's Organization, Zimbabuie African Na-
tional Union and Zimbabuie African People's Union all sought to participate 
in the Conference. 68 On the strength of the votes of a developing bloc of coun-
tries, these political entities were invited to participate fully in the delibera-
tions of the Conference but were not permitted to vote. 69 In addition, 
representatives of Guinea-Bisseau, which had acceded to the Geneva Conven-
tions, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam 
(PRG), which had purported to deposit an instrument of accession to the 
Geneva Conventions,70 also sought invitations to the Conference. Guinea-
Bisseau was invited and given full voting privileges, while the PRG's proposed 
participation was defeated by a single vote. 71 
ICRC also convened its own experts in conference, and consulted numerous other parties, in-
dividual and collective, prior to the convening of the second Conference. See MiramanofT-
Chilikine, supra note 62, at 39. 
66. Report of U.S. Delegation - First Session, supra note 64, at 6. 
67. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
68. Report of U.S. Delegation-First Session, supra note 64, at 29. 
69. Extracts from the Final Act, supra note 1, at 123. 
70. Article 129 of the GPW provides, for example, that "it shall be open to any power in whose 
name the present Convention has not been signed, to accede to this Convention. GPW, supra 
note 2, art. 129 (emphasis added). The question becomes one of interpreting what constitutes a 
"power." 
71. In the most dramatic vote of the Conference, the proposal to invite the PRG to participate 
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The governmental delegations then turned their attention to the substantive 
matters before the Conference,72 but the increasing pressure to provide 
enhanced status for wars of national liberation again was asserted. This 
pressure culminated in the passage of an amended Article 1 of Protocol 1 
which makes certain that wars of national liberation are to be deemed "inter-
national" armed conflicts and therefore subject to the provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 as well as the new Protocol. 73 
Article 1 provides in relevant part: 
1. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, 
shall apply to the situations referred to in Article 2 common 
to those Conventions. 
2. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph in-
clude armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against 
colonial domination and alien occupation and against 
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination, as enshrined in the charter of the United 
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations. 74 
These two paragraphs effectively transform certain internal conflicts, 
previously considered to be matters of domestic jurisdiction, into international 
conflicts. 75 
This, of course, has a substantial impact on the protections to be accorded 
to the individuals involved in these conflicts. Before reaching discussion of 
those protections however, it is necessary to indicate some interpretational dif-
ficulties which may arise from the above language. 
First, the incorporation of Protocol I in Article 1 of the United Nations 
Charter and the Declaration on Friendly Relations may be misconstrued as 
sanctioning the use of force by certain "peoples" seeking to achieve an in-
herent right.16 However, neither the U.N. Charter nor the Declaration 
was defeated by a vote of 37 to 38 with 33 abstentions after strong lobbying by the U.S. for as 
many adverse votes as possible. Stt Report of U.S. Delegation-First Session, supra note 64, at 5; 
Stt also DePue, supra note 45, at 92-93; Baxter, supra note 51, at 9-10. 
72. E.g. Determining the basic rules of the methods and means of warfare. 
73. Article 1 was adopted by a vote of 70 to 21 with 13 abstentions. Stt U.S. Delegation to the 
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian 
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts - Second Session, February 3-AprilI8, 1975, Report (1975) 
(available at Harvard Law School library) [hereinafter cited as Report ofU .S. Delegation - Sec-
ond Session]. 
74. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 1. 
75. Stt gtntrally, Graham, supra note 5, at 44. 
76. Set id. at 40-41. 
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specifically grant or intend such a right. The Declaration on Friendly Rela-
tions, for example, speaks only to the validity of difensive actions on the part of 
a people seeking self-determination. 77 
Second, additional difficulty may develop in determining the point at 
which fighting between a government and a "peoples" becomes an "armed 
conflict" of an international character in terms of Article 1. It would seem that 
various traditional and "motivational" criteria might be involved in such a 
determination, with consideration given to the more conventional criteria in-
cluding: the scale of the hostilities; the amount of territory effectively con-
trolled; and the establishment by the "peoples" of an orderly government/B 
as well as the "motivational" factor of whether or not there was legitimate 
cause for rebellion. 79 Such criteria will unfortunately raise the expectation that 
subjective appraisals of each conflict will be made by future adversaries, each 
side characterizing the conflict according to its own self-interests. BO 
Third, the correct interpretation and scope to be given to "armed conflicts 
in which peoples are fighting against racist regimes," poses yet another prob-
lem. According to a U.S. delegate to the Diplomatic Conference, the 
references to "colonial domination" and "racist regimes" were directed 
essentially to Southern Africa - to South Africa, Namibia (South West 
Africa), Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies, such as Angola and Mozam-
bique - and primarily reflected the concerns of the members of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity. The reference to "peoples fighting against ... alien oc-
cupation"BI referred to the Palestinians. Such a subordination of legal and 
humanitarian considerations for short-term political goals in isolated geo-
political settings is an obvious defect in the Protocols. 
77. The Declaration provides in pertinent part: 
Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Charter of their right to self-determination and 
freedom and independence. In their actions against resistance to such forcible action in pursuit 
of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to 
receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No 28) 121, U.N. Doc. 28 (A/8028) (1970) (emphasis 
added), cited in Graham supra note 5, at 40-41. The State as a person of international law should 
possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Convention on Rights 
and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933 art. 1,49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881,165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
78. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 16, at 249. Note that this determination would lack two of the 
traditional criteria for "international" status: 1) that the rebellious forces act under the direction 
of an organized and responsible civil authority and tend to observe the ordinary rules of war; and 
2) that there exists a practical necessity for third states to define their attitude toward the conflict. 
79. As this determination ultimately passes judgment on the political objectives of the rebels, it 
is antithetical to traditional international law which made a distinction between international and 
non-international armed conflicts on the basis of a "geomilitary scale." See Forsythe, The 1974 
Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law: Some Observations, 69 AM. j. INT'L L. 77,80 (1975). 
[hereinafter cited as Forsythe]. 
80. Cj. Baxter, supra note 45, at 16; DePue, supra note 39, at 95-97. 
81. See Baxter, supra note 45, at 12. 
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This subordinating methodology also has the effect of denying to the victims 
of other types of internal struggles any additional humanitarian protections 
from Protocol!. For instance, the inclusive nature of the listing in Article 1 
does nothing to aid those victims of civil wars that are neither anti-colonialist, 
alien nor racist. Moreover, Article 1 of the Second Protocol applicable to in-
ternal conflicts82 has established a threshold so high as to make it unlikely that 
Protocol II will be applied to all but full-scale belligerencies.83 Thus, as one 
eminent observer has pointed out, "[b]y substituting political for objective 
criteria, the amended First Article effectively deprives the victims of un-
popular noninternational struggles of any added humanitarian protection.' 's. 
For these reasons, the United States and other Western powers have de-
clared that the first article represents the introduction of jus ad bellum into jus in 
bello, i. e., the introduction of norms about the initiation of war (just war con-
cepts) into the law regulating the process of war. 85 As a result, the head of the 
United States Delegation asserted that Article 1 remains a serious threat to 
American accession to the Protocol,86 Nevertheless, the strong vote of con-
fidence this measure received at the Conference indicates that it will un-
doubtedly become valid treaty law. Just as the customary international law 
which evolved during the nineteenth century reflected the political preferences 
of the European nations and the United States, so too the rules expressing the 
political preferences of a majority of states at the recent Diplomatic Con-
ference will undoubtedly become valid treaty law and may also evolve into 
customary law. 87 
Given the recognition by the Diplomatic Conference of the legality of the 
82. Article 1 of Protocol II supra note 3, provides in relevant part: 
This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949 .... shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not 
covered by Article 1 of the Protocol (I) and which took place in the territory of a High 
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organ-
ized armed groups, which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a 
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement the Protocol. 
83. Protocol II, supra note 3, art. 1; see DePue, supra note 45, at 98-99; see also Report of U.S. 
Delegation - Second Session, supra note 73, at 8. 
84. See DePue, supra note 45, at 98. 
85. See Forsythe, supra note 79, at 80-81; see generally Graham, supra note 5. 
86. See Aldrich, Establishing Legal Norms Through Multilateral Negotiation - The Laws of War, 11 
INT'L LAW. 107, 108 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Aldrich). 
87. See generally, Bond, Amended Article 1 of Draft Pro/o&oll to the [949 GeneVIJ Conventions: The Com-
ing of Age of the Guerrilla, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 65, 68 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bond). Note 
that two somewhat similar views emerged from the representatives of the European powers who 
met in Brussels in 1874 to codify the law of war. Those countries with great armies urged that the 
status of lawful belligerency should attach only to organized forces and that members of a levee en 
masse should meet the requirements of other combatants. The smaller powers, because of their 
relatively small organized forces were reluctant to limit in any way the right of inhabitants in oc-
cupied territory to rise up and defend their country. See Nurick & Barrett, Legality of Guerrilla 
Forces Under the Laws of War, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 565 (1946). 
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use of force by various individuals or states in order to achieve certain political 
goals, it is important to examine the degree to which individuals are afforded 
added protection under the new Protocol. If certain conflicts formerly viewed 
as "internal" were to be accorded an "international" status while prisoner-
of-war status were denied to insurgent fighters, this would negate the 
humanitarian purpose of the Diplomatic Conference, and provide the in-
surgents with little incentive to abide by the new rules themselves. 88 
Therefore, this Comment will examine the new criteria for the prisoner-of-war 
protections offered by the new Protocol and evaluate them in light of the 
humanitarian and pragmatic considerations which underline the international 
law of warfare. 
IV. ARTICLES 43 AND 44 OF PROTOCOL I. 
A. Liberalized Conditions for Prisoner-of- War Status 
As was the case with the movement for "internationalizing" certain inter-
nal conflicts in the United Nations, the philosophy expressed in the General 
Assembly Resolution 3103 (XXVIII), Basic Principles of the Legal Status of Com-
batants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist RegimesB9 was a 
harbinger of the enhanced status that guerrillas were to be accorded at the 
Diplomatic Conference. One of the Resolution's provisions is of particular 
importance: 
4. The combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination 
and racist regimes captured as prisoners are to be accorded the status 
of prisoners of war and their treatment should be in accordance with 
the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. 90 
Implicit in this provision is the General Assembly's rejection of Article 4 of the 
Geneva Conventions which lists several conditions precedent for entitlement 
to prisoner-of-war status. 91 The phrase "[tJhe combatants" suggests that all 
combatants regardless of their compliance with the Article 4 criteria were to be 
88. For a discussion on the relation of reciprocity to these issues, see notes 157-59 infra and ac-
companying text. 
89. G.A. Res. 3103 (XXVIII) (Dec. 12, 1973). 
90. Id. It is noteworthy that the incumbent government was prohibited from using contract 
combatants in defending itself: 
The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the national liberation 
movements struggling for their freedom and independence from the yoke of colonialism 
and alien domination is considered to be a criminal act and the mercenaries should ac-
cordingly be punished as criminals. 
Id., art. 5. 
91. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
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given prisoner-of-war status (and then) the provisions of the GPW will apply to 
their treatment. 92 
While adopting these ideas in spirit, the representatives at the Diplomatic 
Conference refrained from a wholesale abdication of the Article 4 criteria of 
the GPW, adopting those requirements which they understood to be essential 
to protect the civilian populace and which would also allow a broader class of 
combatants to be accorded prisoner-of-war treatment. As promulgated by 
these representatives, two key articles of Protocol I list the new requirements 
for combatant and prisoner-of-war status. Combatants are defined by Article 
43, which is entitled "Armed forces" and provides in pertinent part: 
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized 
armed forces, groups and units which are under a command respon-
sible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that 
Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized 
by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an inter-
nal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance 
with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. 93 
Prisoner-of-war status is granted under Article 44, which is entitled "Com-
batants and Prisoners of War" and provides in relevant part: 
1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power 
of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war. 
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from 
the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an 
attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. Recogniz-
ing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, 
owing to the nature of the hostilities, an armed combatant cannot 
distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, pro-
vided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: 
(a) during each military engagement, and 
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary 
while he is engaged in a military deployment pre-
ceding the launching of an attack in which he is to 
participate . . .94 
These provisions indicate that many of the former conditions for entitle-
92. Such a view is in accordance with the preamble of Res. 3103, that "colonial people have 
the inherent right to struggle by all necessary m4ans at their disposal against colonial powers and 
alien domination in the exercise of their right of self-determination .... " G.A. Res. 3103, supra 
note 89 (emphasis added). 
93. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43. 
94. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 44. 
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ment to prisoner-of-war status have been largely retained. Six conditions were 
required to be met by irregular fighters which were impliedly present in Arti-
cle 1 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and made explicit in Article 4 of the 
GPW of 1949. 95 These six conditions required irregular combatants to: 
1) belong to an organized group; 
2) belong to a Party to the conflict; 
3) be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
4) have a fixed distinctive sign; 
5) carry their arms openly; and 
6) conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war. 96 
Only the need for the fourth condition has been abandoned, with respect to 
guerrillas, as such combatants are no longer required to wear clothing distinc-
tive from that worn by the populace at large. 97 
However, the requirement that irregular fighters, e.g. guerrillas, "conduct 
their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war" may pro-
duce difficulty under Protocol I. This is because a reading of either Article 43 
or 44 separately might yield a different result than if the two provisions were 
read together. On one hand, Article 43 mandates that "armed forces shall be 
subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce com-
pliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.' '98 On 
the other hand, Article 44 states that "violations of the rules of international 
law ... shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant or ... a 
prisoner of war, [except where he fails to distinguish himself by carrying arms 
openly in accordance with Article 44, paragraph 3].' '99 Where, for example, it 
is prohibited under customary international law to kill or wound those who 
have surrendered,loo the former provision would not permit combatancy 
status to be granted to those engaging in such a practice. Furthermore, since 
prisoner-of-war status is granted only to combatants under Article 44, the 
former Article would prevent their entitlement to prisoner-of-war status as 
well. lol However, the latter Article would seem to permit the application of 
prisoner-of-war status despite the violations of basic customary law. 
95. Cj Draper, supra note 19, at 195-96. 
96. GPW, supra note 2, art. 4. 
97. With respect to regular armies, however, Article 44, paragraph 7 states that 
.. [t )his article is not intended to change the generally accepted practice of states with 
respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed 
armed units of a Party to the conflict." GPW, supra note 2, art. 44, para. 7. 
98. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43, para. 1; see note 93 supra and accompanying text. 
99. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 44, para. 2. 
100. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 23(c). 
101. Article 44 which permits prisoner-of-war status to be accorded to certain guerrillas, 
speaks only to combatants. See note 94 supra and accompanying text. 
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It is submitted that these two provisions are properly reconciled by making 
the legal distinction between individual and collective responsibility.l02 The 
requirements of Article 43, i.e., organization, responsible command, and 
compliance with the laws and customs of war, are applicable to the group col-
lectively, and not to the individual members. 103 Thus, where the overwhelming 
majority of the individual members of the group comply with the laws of war-
fare, the members of that group are deemed to be combatants. Under Article 
44 therefore, the individual who fails to comply with the laws of war does not 
forfeit his right to combatant status, or upon capture, prisoner-of-war 
status. IO• However, he is liable to be tried, as a prisoner of war. for violations of 
international law .105 
Significantly, the Article 43 and 44 requirements for combatant and 
prisoner-of-war status apply to both regulars and irregulars alike. However. in 
the effort to develop a single standard for entitlement to prisoner-of-war status 
which would be applicable to both groups, concern developed that such a rule 
would encourage uniformed regular armies to dress in civilian clothes. l06 
Therefore, paragraph 7 of Article 44 was drafted to provide that" [t]his Article 
is not intended to change the generally accepted practice of states with respect 
to the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, uniform-
ed armed units of a Party to the conflict. 107 Furthermore, paragraph 3 of Arti-
cle 44 reads, "combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population," except where, "owing to the nature of the hostilities an 
armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself [but must carry arms openly 
at key moments.]" 108 
The latter provision marks an exception to the general requirement of a 
combatant's distinction from the civilian population during all phases of 
military operations. This exception is of utmost importance since it combines 
with other provisions of Articles 43 and 44 to carve out more liberalized 
102. This distinction was drawn by Draper. supra note 19. at 196-97; Meyrowitz. Le Slalul des 
Saboleurs dans Ie Droil de la Guerre. 1966 MIL. L. WAR REV. 5. 133-34. 
103. Note that Article 43 is entitled "armed forces" which is also suggestive of group. as op-
posed to individual. responsibilities. 
104. Protocol I. supra note 3. art. 44. para. 2. Several representatives at the Diplomatic Con-
ference suggested that it should be clearly stated that. if a group of combatants announced that it 
would not respect the laws and in fact consistently violated them. all members of the group should 
forfeit their right to p.o.w. status. Others argued. however. that such behavior was unlikely given 
the requirements of what is now Article 43. See U . S. Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on 
the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed 
Conflicts - Third Session. April 21 - June 11. 1976. Report 121 (1976) (available at Harvard 
Law School library) [hereinafter cited as Report of U.S. Delegation - Third Session]. 
105. GPW. supra note 2. art. 85. provides: "Prisoners of war prosecuted under the law of the 
Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain. even if convicted. the benefits of 
the present Convention." 
106. See Report of U.S. Delegation - Third Session. supra note 104. at 120. 
107. See id. 
108. GPW. supra note 2. art. 44. para. 3; see note 94 supra and accompanying text. 
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criteria for the guerrilla's entitlement to prisoner-of-war status than were pre-
sent under the GPW. Therefore, this study will examine the new criteria in 
terms of the rationale for their retention, modification or elimination of the 
GPW requirements in light of the humanitarian and pragmatic purposes of 
Protocol!. 
B. Examination of Criteria for Prisoner-oj- War Status 
Under Protocol I, guerrilla forces must meet five criteria, four collectively 
and one individually, in order to claim properly prisoner-of-war status: They 
must collectively: (1) be of a Party to a conflict; (2) be organized; (3) be under 
a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates; (4) be 
subject to an internal disciplinary system which shall enforce compliance with 
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict; 109 and a combatant 
must, as an individual, (5) carry arms openly, a) during each military engage-
ment, and b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is 
engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in 
which he is to participate. llo 
Of these five criteria, only the fifth appears to present the pure case where 
the criterion is solely related to status identification, as to some degree the 
others have the effect of using prisoner-of-war status as a lever to assure con-
formity with the laws of warfare. III However, criteria not directly related to 
status identification have typically informed states in their decision making. 
Suggestive of this practice has been the view of the United States Department 
of Defense that organized guerrilla forces should be accorded prisoner-of-war 
status, but must meet among others, the requirements of having a 
recognizable system of command and of conforming to the existing laws of 
war. 1I2 The promulgation of these requirements and others in Protocol I in-
dicates that chivalrous and pragmatic norms continue to playa strong role in 
the law of warfare, and should provide guidance in the interpretation of the 
new requirements. 
1. "Of a Party to a Conflict" 
The first of the new requirements, i. e., that armed forces be "of a Party to a 
conflict," differs somewhat from the language of Article 4 of the GPW, which 
requires that resistance movements belong to a Party to the conflict.1I3 The 
109. GPW, supra note 2, art. 43, para. 1; su note 93 supra and accompanying text. 
110. GPW, supra note 2, art. 44, para. 3; see note 94 supra and accompanying text. 
111. Cf DePue, supra note 45, at 120. 
112. See Prugh, Current Initiatives to Reaffirm and Develop International HU11IIJnitarian Law Applicable 
in Armed Conflicts, 8 INT'L LAW. 262, 265 (1974) (extracts from a statement made by Major 
General Prugh, the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, on Behalf of the Depart-
ment of Defense, before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, Sept. 
20, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Prugh]. 
113. GPW, supra note 2, art. 4, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
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language is as follows: "belonging to a party to the conflict. " The omission of 
the word "belonging" marks an important change in the status of guerrilla 
movements. Formerly, it was necessary for such movements to at least have a 
de facto link with a belligerent state. 114 It was considered to be inadequate that 
the group merely received logistic support in food, clothing, stores, weaponry 
and transport, from such a Party.115 However, certain recent conflicts have 
demonstrated the difficulty of establishing the international responsibility of 
the State to which the movements were linked. 116 It was therefore proposed 
that the criterion of "belonging to a Party" be changed to that of the political 
motive found to be at the base of the activity of the movement, so as to 
distinguish it from an armed group seeking only private interests. ll7 Thus, 
under Article 43, the terms "of a Party to a conflict" might, in certain cases, 
apply to the movement itself. 118 
2. Organization 
The second of the new requirements that" [t ]he armed forces of a Party to a 
conflict [shall] consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units" 119 
merely repeats the rule of G PW Article 4. The requirement of organization is 
designed to prevent irregular fighters from operating on their own since in-
dividuals dispatched on special missions by groups or on personal initiative are 
normally engaged in intelligence or sabotage assignments which are sufficient 
to require the recognition of wide retaliatory powers vested in their captors. 120 
However, if the individual captive belongs to a group whose organization is 
not prejudiced by his solo venture, and he himself does not conceal his identity 
as a combatant,121 is not a marauder or spy, and is not following the orders of 
114. See Meyrowitz, La Guerilla etle Droit de la Guerre: Problernes Principaux, 7 R.B.D.1. 56, 59 
(1971); 6 CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 65, at 10, 17. 
115. See Draper, supra note 19, at 200. 
116. See Frahleigh, The Algerian Revolution as a Case Study in International Law, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 195 (R. Falk ed. 1971). 
117. See 6 CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 65, at 110; Veuthey, Regles et 
Principes de Droit International Humo.nitaire Applicables dans La Guerilla, 7 R. B.D. I. 505, 511 (1971). 
118. See 6 CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 65, at 100; U.N. 
Sec'y-General, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/8052, paras. 214, 
230 & 231 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Report of the Sec'y-General]. 
119. GPW, supra note 2, art. 43, para. 1; see note 93 supra and accompanying text. 
120. See Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged &Iligerency': Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT'L L. 323 (1951), reprinted in 1975 MIL. L. REV. BICENT. ISSUE 487,508 [hereinafter cited as 
'Unprivileged Belligerency 1; see also Draper, supra note 19, at 20. 
121. A member of armed forces who operates as a concealed fighter, e.g., as a civilian, en-
gaged on a solitary mission, is not entitled to p.o.w. status under article 4 of the GPW. See 
Muhammo.d Ali and Another v. Public Prosecutor, [1968] 3 ALL E.R. 488 (P.C.) in which members of 
the armed forces of Indonesia, while in civilian clothing, placed a bomb in an office building in 
Singapore, which, upon explosion, killed three civilians. On appeal, their sentence of death from 
the trial court was upheld, because the appellants had forfeited their rights under the GPW by 
engaging in sabotage in civilian clothes. 
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the group,122 then he may properly claim entitlement to be treated as a 
prisoner of war under Article 44.123 
3. Responsible Command 
The third criterion for combatant and prisoner-of-war status under the first 
Protocol requires that armed forces are to be "under a command responsible 
to [the Party to a conflict] for the conduct of its subordinates. "124 This marks a 
significant departure from the language of Article 4 of the GPW which re-
quires that the armed forces be "commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates. "125 
The Article 4 language required modification for at least two reasons: first, 
the necessity of an individual commander was not easily met in those guerrilla 
movements which operated under a collegial authority; second, the structure 
of the guerrilla movement and of its command were very often closely guarded 
secrets, unknown to most of the fighters. 126 Therefore the expression "to be 
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates" was changed to read 
"a command responsible .... for ... its subordinates."127 This criterion is 
understood to necessitate only a commanding authority whose leadership is 
recognized by subordinates and who (which) is able therefore to assume 
responsibility for their acts.12S It should be noted, however, that the essential 
aim of such a condition is not status identification, but of having a command 
capable of ensuring respect for the laws and customs of war. 129 
4. Respectfor the Rules of War 
Respect for the laws and customs of war constitutes the fourth requirement 
necessary to be fulfUled by a group in order to entitle its members to combat-
ant and prisoner-of-war status. Specifically, Article 43 requires that "[s]uch 
armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter 
alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in 
122. See Draper, supra note 19, at 200, where it is noted that special missions by groups ofir-
regular fighters are normally intelligence or sabotage assignments which would probably debar 
the group from having combatant and hence prisoner-of-war status. 
123. Such an individual may draw protection from article 45 of Protocol I which provides that 
.. a person who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be pre-
sumed to be a prisoner of war .... " Protocol I, supra note, art. 45. (emphasis added); see notes 
148-51 supra and accompanying text. 
124. GPW, supra note 2, art. 43, para. 1; see note 93 supra and accompanying text. 
125. GPW, supra note 2, art. 4, para. A(2). 
126. &e 1970 Report of the Sec'y-General, supra note 118, at para. 176. 
127. Id. (emphasis added). 
128. &e 6 CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 65, at 13; see also Potapov, Rea/-
jimuJtion and Development of Intemational HlU1UUIitarian lAw, 190 INT'LREV. RED CROSS 3,111(1970). 
129. See 6 CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 65, at 13; see also 1970 Report of 
the Sec'y-General, supra note 118, para. 176; if. id. at para. 191 (b). 
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armed conflict." 130 This provision refers to the respect of the laws and customs 
of war by the group as a whole, whether or not individual members fulfill this 
condition. 131 Thus, the anomalous situation develops that if a majority of the 
group fails to comply with the laws of war, e.g., fails to give quarter in viola-
tion of Article 40 of Protocol I, then the individual member of that group, 
although not participating in the violation himself, will not be entitled to com-
batant or prisoner-of-war status. 132 The converse would also hold, and would 
be equally anomalous. 133 However, such a criterion, while not essential to the 
determination of entitlement to prisoner-of-war status, does serve the 
humanitarian and pragmatic purpose of providing guerrillas with an incentive 
to comply with the laws of war. 
5. Carrying Arms Openly 
The fifth of the new requirements for prisoner-of-war status is directed to 
the individual combatant, who, owing to the nature of hostilities, cannot 
distinguish himself from the civilian population. Such a combatant will retain 
that status provided that he carries his arms openly: (a) during each military 
engagement, and (b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he 
is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in 
which he is to participate. 134 Since the guerrilla commonly seeks to overcome 
technological, economic, or manpower deficiencies, the exception to the nor-
mal requirement of distinguishing clothing "owing to the nature of the 
hostilities," will undoubtedly become the rule in guerrilla warfare. 135 
However, the condition of "carrying arms openly" is essentially related to 
the condition of identifiability. 136 Thus, most of the experts consulted by the 
ICRC advocated abandoning the requirement of a fixed distinctive sign; some 
proposing to replace it with the present requirement that the struggle be car-
ried on openly, i. e. J without the combatants concealing their weapons. 137 This 
position was endorsed by the United Nations Secretary-General in his second 
Report on the Respect of Human Rights in Armed Conflicts which accepted 
the view that the more important condition of carrying arms openly could 
replace that of wearing a fixed distinctive sign. 138 
130. GPW, supra note 2, art. 43, para. I; see note 93 supra and accompanying text. 
131. See 6 CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 65, at 14, citing 1970 Report of 
the Sec'y-General, supra note 118 at para. 179. 
132. See Draper, supra note 19, at 204-05. 
133. See generally 6 CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 65, at 13-14. 
134. GPW, supra note 2, art. 44, para. 3; see note 94 supra and accompanying text. 
135. But see note 107 supra, (the Protocol's effort to maintain the status quo with respect to the 
regular soldier's wearing of a uniform). 
136. Cj Draper, supra note 19, at 203. 
137. See 6 CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 65, at II. 
138. See 1970 Report of the Sec'y-General, supra note 18, at 122. 
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Significantly, the abandonment of the distinctive clothing criteria in certain 
hostilities may not constitute as radical a departure from the former re-
quirements as might initially appear. The Second Report of the Secretary-
General, for example, noted that the requirement of carrying arms openly in 
operations preparatory to combat would encompass the "infiltration into 
enemy lines" but not "ancillary activities such as information-gathering and 
propaganda among citizens. "139 In addition, implicit in such a rule is the con-
dition that the combatant knows, or should know, that he is visible.140 Fur-
thermore, the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status is explicitly pro-
hibited as an act of perfidy under another Article of the first Protoco1. 1H 
The legal effect of failure to disclose is discussed further in paragraph 4 of 
Article 44. This paragraph is the result of a last minute compromise worked 
out during the third session of the Diplomatic Conference between the West, 
which sought to deny prisoner-of-war status to combatants failing to wear 
distinctive clothing, and those countries desiring the extension of such status 
to guerrillas regardless. 1U As finally adopted at the fourth session, paragraph 4 
provides a separate but equal status for those combatants taken prisoner while 
failing to display arms openly , 'during each military engagement and 
preceding attack when engaged in deployment operations . . . visible to the 
adversary. "143 Such fighters are not to be prisoners of war, as they have 
forfeited combatant status, but nevertheless shall benefit from procedural and 
substantive protections equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the 
GPW and Protocoll.'H They could be subject therefore to punishment for the 
perfidious act of feigning civilian status, to which a prisoner of war would not 
be subject, while retaining equivalent procedural and substantive safeguards 
otherwise granted to p.o.w.'s generally. This paragraph codifies the practice 
in South Vietnam and Algeria, for example, where both traditionally attired 
soldiers and many guerilla groups were given a de facto prisoner-of-war 
status. 145 
139. [d. 
140. See Report of U.S. Delegation - Third Session, supra note 104, at 122. 
141. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 37(1)(c). Note, however, that the final sentence of paragraph 
3 of article 44 reads: •• Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be 
considered perfidious ... " /d., art. 44, para. 3. This was designed to make clear that those who 
comply with the requirements of paragraph 3 cannot be punished through the concept of perfidy 
for "feigning civilian status." See Report of U.S. Delegation - Third Session, supra note 104, at 
122. 
142. See Aldrich, supra note 86, at 108-09. 
143. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 44, para. 4. The outcome of the vote on Article 44 was 66 in 
favor of the present text, 2 against, and 18 abstentions. This text is viewed as the best possible 
compromise "if proper account were to be taken of the legal requirements and reality." Summary 
of the Fourth Session, supra note 1, at 342. 
144. See Report of U.S. Delegation - Third Session, supra note 104, at 123; DePue, supra note 
45, at 121 n.176. 
145. See Forsythe, Three Sessions of Legislating Humanitarian Law: Forward March, Retreat, or Parade 
Rest?, 11 INT'L LAW. 131 (1977). 
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6. Other Protections 
Guerrillas also draw increased protection from paragraph 5 of Article 44. 
This provision ensures that a combatant who is taken prisoner while not 
engaged in an attack or deployment operation shall retain his rights as a com-
batant and as a prisoner of war regardless of past violations of the rule of 
disclosure under paragraph 3.146 This provision is designed to prevent captors 
from any efforts to find or falsify past histories as to deprive the prisoners of 
their protections. 1t7 
In addition to the protections under Article 44, guerrillas claiming prisoner-
of-war status shall be presumed entitled to such status under Article 45. That 
Article provides that one who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power 
of an adverse Party shall be presumed to be a prisoner of war if he claims such 
status, or if he appears entitled to such status, or if the Party on which he 
depends claims such status on his behalf.148 It further provides that where 
there is doubt as to his entitlement to prisoner-of-war status, he shall continue 
to have such status and the protections it affords under the GPW and the Pro-
tocol until his status has been determined by a competent tribunal. 149 
Therefore, the captor may not frustrate the humanitarian purpose of the Pro-
tocol by denying prisoner-of-war status to a captive whose entitlement to such 
status is uncertain. 150 Article 45 additionally provides that a person who is not 
considered to be a prisoner of war and who is to be tried for a criminal offense 
arising out of the hostilities may assert his entitlement to prisoner-of-war 
status and have that question adjudicated anew by a judicial tribunal. 151 
Thus, the criteria for prisoner-of-war status and the mechanism for assert-
ing such status have been broadened so as to encompass more combatants. 
Given the Protocol's purpose of "the protection of victims in international 
armed conflicts,"152 the new criteria are properly designed to further this end 
relative to the combatants. 
In order for the new criteria to receive acceptance however, it must appear 
as a practical matter that the benefits to be received by the application of the 
new criteria outweigh the costs to be incurred thereby. It therefore, becomes 
146. See note 144 supra. 
147. See Report of U.S. Delegation - Third Session, supra note 104, at 123. 
148. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 45, para. 1. 
149. [d. Such a tribunal may be administrative in nature. See Report of U.S. Delegation -
Third Session, supra note 104, at 15. 
150. This carries over the rule from GPW, supra note 2, art. 5(a), which provides: 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and 
having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories listed in Arti-
cle 4 (for p.o.w. status) such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Conven-
tion until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal. 
151. See Report of U.S. Delegation - Third Session, supra note 104, at 15-16. 
152. See Summary of 1M Fourth Session, supra note 1, at 338. 
1978) GUERRILLAS AS P-O-WS 155 
necessary to evaluate the viability and the effectiveness of the new criteria in 
serving the needs of modern warfare by means of a cost-benefit analysis. 
C. Evaluation of the New Criteria: Cost-Benefit Ana(ysis 
A necessary result of the characterization in Article 1 of the conflicts waged 
by selected national liberation movements as wars of international character is 
the need for the rules governing the treatment of those participating in such 
conflicts to encompass as broad a class of combatants as possible. 153 The new 
criteria under Articles 43 and 44 represent an effort to liberalize the conditions 
to be fulfilled for prisoner-of-war status so as to meet that need. One impor-
tant benefit which might accrue from the liberalized criteria is the extension of 
the humanitarian protections of prisoner-of-war treatment to greater numbers 
than before. 
A less altruistic and more pragmatic benefit may also result from the 
liberalized criteria. Since these criteria were designed to permit increased 
numbers of guerrilla combatants to qualify for prisoner-of-war status, this will 
likely provide guerrillas with an incentive to abide by the laws of war, if only to 
obtain prisoner-of-war status for themselves. 154 
In order to receive the protections afforded by the GPW and the new Pro-
tocol, guerrilla movements must themselves comply with their provisions to 
the extent they are viewed as necessary by the opposing party to the conflict. 
This follows from the fact that Article 94 of the first Protocol permits only a 
Party to the Geneva Conventions to accede to the new document. Moreover, 
it is unlikely that a guerrilla movement will possess the capacity to become a 
Party thereby binding itself to follow its provisions. Therefore, in order to find 
that a conflict between a Party to the Protocol and a guerrilla movement is 
covered by the Protocols one must look to Article 96 of that instrument. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 96 provides: 
When one of the Parties to the conflict is not bound by this Protocol, 
the Parties to the Protocol shall remain bound by it in their mutual 
relations. They shall furthermore be bound by this Protocol in rela-
tion to each of the Parties which is not bound by it, if the latter accepts 
and applies the provisions thereof. 155 
A clear obligation is imposed upon guerrilla movements participating in 
153. See DePue, supra note 45, at 122. 
154. See id. 
155. This is substantially equivalent to Article 2 common to all four Geneva Conventions, 
supra note 2, which provides: 
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, 
the Powers who are parties thereto shall be bound by it in their mutual relations. They 
shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter 
accepts and applies the provisions thereof. 
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wars of liberation to apply the rules of international warfare as codified in Pro-
tocol 1. This provision therefore is repugnant to an interpretation of Protocol I 
as imposing a unilateral obligation on the incumbent Party to apply its provi-
sions. Thus, despite the language of Article 1 that "[t]he High Contracting 
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for this Protocol in all cir-
cumstances," IS6 the obligations under the Protocol are conditional upon 
mutual compliance. ls7 
It is submitted that Protocol I's imposition of the concept of reciprocity will 
further the humanitarian aims of that instrument in those cases where the 
guerrilla movement is capable of applying its provisions. By conditioning ap-
plication of prisoner-of-war status upon the guerrillas' complying with the 
laws of war, it will provide an incentive for guerrilla movements to enforce 
compliance with the Protocol, enhancing the treatment of their captives. 
Reciprocity will also have the salutary effect of enhancing the signatory state's 
compliance with the laws of warfare in the expectation that its opponents are 
working towards the same goal. Furthermore, considerations of pragmatism 
dictate that one of the most important forces which exists for compliance with 
the laws of war be brought to bear in an effort to give effect to language which 
has been poorly received in the actual practice of states. ISS 
In many cases, however, guerrilla movements may be unwilling to meet the 
new criteria for prisoner-of-war status. It is not unreasonable to assume that 
most guerrillas will choose not to comply with all of the conditions under Ar-
ticles 43 and 44. For example, the requirement of a combatant's carrying arms 
openly while engaged in a deployment operation preparatory to an attack will 
likely not be followed since secrecy and surprise are the essence of such war-
fare. ls9 
Moreover, it is probable that many guerrilla movements will be incapable 
of complying with the laws of war. As regards their taking prisoner those who 
have laid down their arms, for example, the long distance patrol fighting 
behind enemy lines is not equipped to detain and evacuate prisoners. 160 
Although Article 41, paragraph 3 of the Protocol provides: 
156. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 1, para.!. 
157. Others maintain the opposite view. See, e.g., Fujita, La Guerre de Liberation Nationale et Ie 
Droit International Hurnanitaire, 53 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 81, 124 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Fujita]. Note also that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1978, 
U.N. Doc. AlCon£. 39/27, art. 60, para. 5, would not permit material breach by one party to a 
humanitarian treaty to release the other party from its obligations. 
158. See generally Baxter, Forcesfor Compliance with the Law of War, 58 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 
82 (1964). 
159. See 'Unprivileged Belligerency', supra note 120, at 492; Draper, supra note 19, at 214. 
160. See generally Report of U.S. Delegation - Third Session, supra note 104, at 14. Note that 
under the Hague Regulations it is forbidden: "(c) to kill or wound an enemy, who, having laid 
down his arms, or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion;" "(d) to 
declare that no quarter will be given." Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 23. 
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When persons entitled to protection as prisoners of war have been 
captured but cannot be evacuated, they shall be released and all 
feasible precautions should be taken to ensure their safety .... 161 
157 
guerrillas may likely be forced to ignore this rule in order to preserve the 
secrecy that is a prerequisite to their own return to safety. 
Similarly, guerrillas may be incapable of properly classifying combatant 
and non-combatant prisoners. This conclusion follows from the reality that the 
guerrilla has neither training in classification and interrogation of prisoners as 
to their status nor access to other information which might disprove the 
prisoner's involvement with acts of warfare. 162 
Where the guerrilla forces do properly take opposing combatants prisoner, 
they will encounter great difficulty in complying with the host of regulations 
governing the treatment of prisoners under the GPW. Such provisions require 
in part: that the quarters of p.o.w.'s be equivalent to those of the detaining 
power; 163 that the food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and 
variety so as to prevent weight loss or the development of nutritional deficien-
cies;16+ and that medical inspections of prisoners of war shall be held at least 
once a month. 165 Guerrilla movements typically relying upon mobility for 
military effectiveness will probably lack the logistical, administrative and 
judicial apparatus to meet these and other requirements. 166 
However, the inability of guerrilla movements to meet the requirements for 
treatment of prisoners of war has not been met with complete disapproval. For 
example, those states who have urged that special consideration should be 
given to liberation movements, have argued that the guerrillas must not be 
constrained by legal principles which would prevent them from achieving their 
goalS. 167 They further urge that as a practical matter the guerrillas cannot be 
held to the same standards of conduct demanded of established states. 16S In ad-
dition, these states may point to the many obligations imposed by the Protocol 
161. See Report of U.S. Delegation - Third Session, supra note 104, at 14. 
162. The recent revised Army Subject Schedule 27-1 states that "[c)ombat soldiers do not 
determine the status of any captured person. All persons captured or detained should be 
evacuated to the detainee collecting point where proper authorities can classify them." Quoted 
from, Protection of Non-Combatants, supra note 14, at 794. 
163. GPW, supra note 2, art. 25. 
164. GPW, supra note 2, art. 26. 
165. GPW, supra note 2, art. 31. 
166. The GPW, supra note 2, also requires, inter a/ill, that prisoners of war shall be provided 
adequate premises for preparing their own food (art. 26); that the detaining power shall bear all 
costs in the prisoners' treatment (art. 31); that adequate facilities for religious services will be pro-
vided (art. 34); that adequate premises and necessary equipment will be provided for recreation 
(art. 38); that all p.o.w.'s shall be paid according to a sliding wage scale (art. 60); that prisoners 
of war shall be allowed to send and receive mail (art. 71); and that no sentence is to be given or 
carried out without recognized judicial guarantees (arts. 99-108). 
167. See Graham, supra note 5, at 41. 
168. [d. Note that military necessity is not considered to be a defense to failure to meet the 
GPW criteria: "[M)ilitary necessity cannot justify disregard of prohibitions themselves embody-
ing a consensus as to what is necessary." Treatment oj Prisoners, supra note 49, at 858. 
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and the Geneva Convention as being unrealistic with regard to 
underdeveloped countries and guerrilla movements generally. Those coun-
tries whose prison facilities are normally inadequate will have a difficult time 
meeting their requirements; a fortiori guerrilla movements will also encounter 
difficulty.169 Thus, these states view derogations from the mutual obligations 
under the Protocol and the Geneva Conventions as permissible despite their 
obvious abrogation of many of the humanitarian goals of the Protocol. 
Unfortunately, the mutual obligations of opposing sides to a conflict to ap-
ply all the provisions of the Protocol may also be abrogated through either 
party's reservations to certain provisions. For example, were a party to issue a 
reservation to the "separate but equal status" for war violators presently pro-
vided in Article 44, grave consequences could result, as the detaining party's 
view of the "justness" of the captive's cause could dictate the quality of treat-
ment. Fear of this possibility arises from several writings which on the one 
hand consider national liberation warriors as entitled to prisoner-of-war treat-
ment, but on the other hand, assert that members of colonialist or racist 
forces are war criminals to be condemned for resisting the liberation 
movements. 170 
This idea has already received the sanction of the Soviet bloc reservation to 
Article 85 of the GPW. That Article provides that prisoners of war prosecuted 
and convicted for pre-capture offenses retain all the benefits afforded to 
p.o.w. 's but may be punished for their particular crime as prisoners of war. 171 
The Soviet states have all issued reservations to this Article believing that 
prisoners of war convicted of war crimes should be treated as common 
criminals.172 Similarly, those peoples fighting a "colonialist" or "racist" state 
may refuse to grant prisoner-of-war treatment to their captives. This would 
undoubtedly weaken the effect of the Protocol since a reservation to Article 44 
as a practical matter would also destroy the non-reserving party's incentive to 
apply that Article. It should be noted however that the first Protocol itself may 
weaken prior efforts to codify the international law of war. The necessity for 
the promulgation of a supplement to the Geneva Conventions reveals that 
there is an inadequacy within the prior rules which should be remedied. Im-
mediate ratification of the new Protocol by the signatories to the Geneva Con-
ventions therefore becomes necessary. Were some but not all parties to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 to accede to the Protocol, the community of the 
169. Professor Bond has also viewed derogation from some of these obligations as permissible, 
finding support in the lack of moral condemnation which would accrue in the case of certain 
violations. See Bond, supra note 87, at 76-78. 
170. See Ginsburg, Wars of National Liberation and the Modern Law of Nations - The Soviet Thesis, 
29 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROB. 910, 920 (1964), cited in DePue, supra note 45, at 100. 
17l. This is similar to article 44, paragraph 2 of Protocol I. However, the new provision is 
viewed as only applying until final conviction. See Report of U. S. Delegation - Third Session, 
supra note 104, at 12l. 
172. See Graham, supra note 5, at 55. 
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Geneva Convention states would be weakened by the fact that different states 
would be bound by different treaty obligations. 173 Thus, if a lengthy period of 
time was to elapse before the world community's acceptance of the Protocols 
took place, legal chaos might ensue in a conflict governed only by the then 
weakened Geneva Conventions. 1 H 
There is a possibility that the United States and a number of other Western 
powers will find the Protocol unacceptable, in light of their historic opposition 
to the broadening of the range of conflicts subject to international rules of war-
fare. 175 This, of course, would lessen the stature of any international agree-
ment on the law of war because the weight such agreements carry is largely a 
function of both the military capabilities of the signatories and of the number 
of states accepting their provisions. 176 As Professor Baxter candidly notes, 
"[n]ew Protocols to which preponderantly developing countries and Eastern 
European countries are parties will be of little utility." 177 
Additional cause for fear of the non-universality of the Protocol's appeal is 
the extent to which much of the West was apparently alienated by the frequent 
subordination oflegal issues to political ones at the Diplomatic Conference. 178 
The action of many states in pursuing short-term political goals at the expense 
of maintaining the integrity of law may frighten off other States from becom-
ing parties to the new Protocol,179 
These particular objections are directed largely against Article 1, providing 
for the internationalization of certain internal wars, rather than against the 
new Articles presenting criteria for prisoner-of-war status. 180 Significantly, 
Articles 43 and H have the apparent support of the United States. They were 
adopted as a result of a compromise proposed by the United States delegation 
in order to reach agreement with the communist nations regarding the proper 
criteria for prisoner-of-war status and the legal consequences for failure to 
meet such criteria. 181 These articles should also be attractive to other states 
questioning accession since the basis of the compromise was the "separate but 
equal treatment" provision whereby the procedural and substantive protec-
173. Set generally Baxter, supra note 51, at 25. 
174. Because the effect of the first article of Protocol I is to transform certain internal conflicts 
into conflicts of an international character, the importance of common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocol II, which govern internal wars, is substantially undercut. Therefore, 
some states no longer view Protocol II as serving any useful purpose. Set Graham, supra note 5, at 
44-45. 
175. Stt generally Bond, supra note 87, at 73; if. Baxter, supra note 51, at 24-26. 
176. Stt generally Baxter, MultilaJeral Trtaties as Evidenct of Customary International Law, 41 BRIT. 
Y. B. INT'L L. 275, 277 (1976). 
177 . Baxter, supra note 51, at 25. 
178. Several authors have expressed this concern. Stt Forsythe, supra note 79, at 77; if. Baxter, 
supra note 51; Graham, supra note 5. 
179. Set Baxter, supra note 51, at 25. 
180. See SIll, B supra. 
181. Stt Aldrich, supra note 86, at 108-09. 
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tions under the Protocol and the Conventions are extended even to those fail-
ing to qualify for prisoner-of-war status. 182 
Nevertheless, one of the criteria for prisoner-of-war status may yet pose an 
obstacle to states' accession. Specifically, the Article 44 criterion which allows 
abandonment of the requirement of distinctive clothing is likely to meet objec-
tion as causing a loss of protection to the civilian population. Indeed, this is a 
cost which must be weighed against the obvious benefits this provision holds 
for the guerrilla. 
In guerrilla warfare especially, non-combatants and combatants look 
discouragingly alike. Since the new criteria may have the unfortunate effect of 
encouraging guerrilla combatants to dress as civilians, this may in turn prove 
costly to the civilian populations. As a consequence of the blurred distinctions, 
many innocent civilian lives may be taken in the belief that the "enemy" is 
hiding behind civilian status. 183 Moreover, since the new criteria do not con-
fine lawful combatancy status to those maintaining the overall outward ap-
pearance of combatants, this may implicate the whole of a "peoples" in the 
warfare. For, as one commentator notes, "the soldier who has reason to 
believe that a wide-eyed child may be carrying a grenade, or who suspects that 
an old woman sitting on the stoop makes bombs, does not think of these people 
as allied nationals, let alone innocent civilians."184 
The cost of providing incentives for guerrilla movements through liberal-
ized prisoner-of-war criteria also may be increased as the incumbent state 
brings counter-guerrilla units into the fray.18S As a practical matter, 
clandestine fighters who conduct operations in civilian dress expose 
themselves and their peoples to overly harsh actions by the incumbent 
states. 186 Such units have typically injured civilian populations in the past by 
waging war against the enemy's infrastructure: destroying homes, villages 
and property which were believed to aid the guerrillas. Similarly, numerous 
civilian victims may be added to the overall destruction in the future as a result 
of the more liberalized criteria. 
However, Protocol I contains several measures designed to protect the 
civilian population from the effects of counter-guerrilla actions. Under the 
Protocol the parties to a conflict are required to "direct their operations only 
against military objectives,"187 since the "civilian population as such, shall 
182. See notes 142-45 supra and accompanying text. 
183. See 6 CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 65, at 25. 
184. Bond, Protection of Non-Combatants, supra note 14, at 789. 
185. Such combatants if "necessary" under Protocol I, article H(c) would qualify for 
prisoner-of-war status. See text accompanying note 94. But see notes 107-08 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
186. See Prugh, supra note 112, at 266; Fujita, supra note 157, at 82; Draper, supra note 16, at 
206. 
187. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 48. 
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not be a lawful object of attack." 188 Additionally, the military strategists of 
such parties are required to take all feasible precautions in planning the 
methods of attack in order to prevent the loss of civilian life. 189 Finally, an 
affirmative duty is placed on the parties to remove the civilian population from 
the vicinity of military objectives to the extent possible.1 90 If properly heeded 
these safeguards should be effective in adequately protecting the civilian 
population. 
D. Evaluation 
In balancing the various costs and benefits to be derived from the more 
liberalized conditions for prisoner-of-war status under Articles 43 and 44, it is 
apparent that the needs of modern warfare are now more properly fulfilled 
than before. This conclusion obtains for several reasons. First, because the 
methods of warfare commonly known to the drafters of the Geneva Conven-
tions, i.e., the employment of uniformed armies operating in fixed battle lines, 
have given way to warfare commonly characterized by guerrilla tactics, the 
legal structure must necessarily adapt itself to the practice of states. Second, 
where national liberation movements are assimilated with international en-
tities, the same rules should govern the obligations and entitlements of both 
groups. Third, those rules should be designed to encompass as broad a class of 
combatants as possible in order to extend fully their humanitarian and 
pragmatic purpose. Therefore, Articles 43 and 44 further this design by per-
mitting guerrillas to obtain more easily prisoner-of-war status, whereby the 
whole panoply of protections under the Protocol and the GPW will govern 
their treatment. Supported by new rules extending increased protections to 
the civilian population, the benefits to be obtained by liberalized criteria for 
prisoner-of-war status outweigh the costs. 
It must be understood, however, that this conclusion rests partially on the 
basis of Article l' s assimilation of certain national liberation movements with 
international entities, and that a different conclusion would obtain if this were 
not so. It is submitted that Article 1 inadequately serves the needs of modern 
warfare because national liberation movements will not likely possess the 
capacity to implement the Protocol and the Geneva Conventions. Never-
theless, given the inclusion of these movements in the Protocol, it is necessary 
to extend the obligations and protections to their combatants. In so doing, 
Articles 43 and 44 strike the proper balance between humanitarianism and 
pragmatism. 
188. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(2). 
189. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 57. 
190. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 58. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Articles 43 and 44 of Protocol I provide liberalized criteria for combatancy 
and prisoner-of-war status. Essentially requiring that the combatant 
distinguish himself by carrying arms openly during military deployments and 
engagements, the new criteria are designed to balance the military needs of 
guerrilla fighters with humanitarian concerns for the civilian populace. 
The guerrilla fighter is benefited by the new criteria as they permit him to 
qualify for prisoner-of-war status with less danger to himself. The better op-
portunity for prisoner-of-war status will provide the guerrilla with an incentive 
to comply with the laws of warfare. This compliance, in turn, benefits 
everyone affected by the hostilities. 
Against these advantages must be weighed the cost to the civilian popula-
tion. In theory, the civilian population should benefit from criteria which are 
designed to deter combatants from concealing their arms and feigning non-
combatant status. In practice, however, the launching of guerrilla tactics from 
a non-segregated civilian populace might lead to the loss of many civilian 
lives. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the substantive protections of Articles 48 
through 58 will be effective in preventing the civilian population from any un-
necessary suffering. 
Implicit in the above conclusions, however, is the condition precedent that 
guerrilla movements will be able to fulfill their obligations under the Protocol 
and the Geneva Conventions. On this point the author is not optimistic. Even 
assuming the guerrilla movements' willingness to apply those instruments, it 
is highly unlikely that they will possess the financial resources necessary to 
provide the administrative machinery required for the proper treatment of 
prisoners of war and civilian detainees. It is feared that the inability of guer-
rillas to incur these reciprocal obligations will have the unfortunate effect of 
engendering the neglect of many of the substantive provisions of the Protocol 
and the Geneva Conventions it seeks to supplement. 
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